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Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture
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ARE CATHOLICS UNRELIABLE FROM A DEMOCRATIC
POINT OF VIEW? THOUGHTS ON THE OCCASION OF THE
SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF PAUL BLANSHARD'S
AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER
PATRICK McKINLEY BRENNAN'
I. INTRODUCTION
F ROM 1949 to 1950, Paul Blanshard's American Freedom and CatholicPower dominated the New York Times best-seller list for eleven months,
having captured the attention and imagination of American intelligentsia
and others with its claim that "the Catholic problem is still with us" and its
clarion for the formation of a "resistance movement" to the Catholic hier-
archy's "antidemocratic social policies."2 People in record numbers did
not just read the book with the abandon that now greets a new John
Grisham novel-they approved of it, agreed with it, even commended it as
a work of fact, not fiction or fanaticism. Distinguished contemporary aca-
demics reviewed Blanshard's book in glowing terms. Writing in The Philo-
sophical Review in 1950, John Boas, of The Johns Hopkins University,
explained that Blanshard "has performed a great service to philoso-
phers."3 In The Philosophical Quarterly in 1952, John Coatman averred that
1. John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law,
Villanova University School of Law. An earlier version of this Giannella Lecture
was delivered at the University of Chicago, as the Yves R. Simon Memorial Lecture,
in November 2009. For insightful comments and questions on that earlier
occasion, I am especially grateful to R.H. Helmholz, Thomas Levergood, and John
O'Callaghan. I owe the excellent suggestion to revisit Blanshard to Levergood.
Ethan Townsend and Mira Baric deserve my thanks for their able research
assistance.
2. PAUL BLANsHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 347 (2d ed.
1958). With one exception to be noted below, all my citations to this book are to
the second edition.
3. George Boas, Book Review, 59 PHIL. REv. 126, 126-27 (1950) (reviewing
PAUL BLANsHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIc POWER (1949)).
(199)
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Blanshard's "treatment is objective, scholarly, and restrained. There are
no mere obiter dicta and no judgments without accompanying evidence."4
Not to be outdone, John Dewey, Blanshard's former teacher, praised his
pupil's "exemplary scholarship, good judgment, and tact."5 Albert Ein-
stein and Bertrand Russell were in favor, too, and McGeorge Bundy of
Harvard considered the publication of American Freedom and Catholic Power
"a very useful thing."6 Someone called Paul Blanshard had succeeded in
taking the intellectual and cultural temperature of his time.7
Times change, and today Blanshard's "great service" is generally re-
garded, when it is not swept under the rug, as the apex of bigotry that
some knew it to be at its inception. Sixty years after the fact, Blanshard's
contribution is not often defended by the educated. Indeed, it is criti-
cized, including recently by Martha Nussbaum. "Under cover of [a] calm
rational manner," she says, "the book purveys all the familiar tropes of
anti-Catholicism." 8 When Nussbaum chides Justice John Paul Stevens for
"want[ing] all Americans to assimilate," she is "tempted" to call his juris-
prudence "Blanshardesque,"9 and people who fear that school vouchers
will lead to a "religious takeover of education" sometimes become, she
says, "Blanshardian."i 0 Neither of Nussbaum's neologisms signals a com-
4. John Coatman, Book Review, 2 PHIL. Q. 284, 284 (1952) (reviewing PAUL
BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949), and PAUL BLAN-
SHARD, COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY AND CATHOLIC POWER (1951)).
5. Letter from John Dewey to Melvin Arnold (June 7, 1949).
6. See John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American
Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84J. AM. HisT. 97, 97-98 (1997).
7. Further evidence of the significance of Blanshard's contribution was preva-
lent; a sampling of that evidence follows. "Thoughtful Americans will continue to
follow the running controversy between Blanshard and his critics in spite of the
tedium of seemingly endless charges and countercharges." Stanley Lichtenstein,
284 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 213, 213 (1952) (reviewing PAUL BLAN-
SHARD, MY CATHOLIC CRITICS (1952)). "This book is most carefully and completely
'documented.' . . . The book contains an immense amount of factual information,
and, even when allowance has been made for the bias of the author, indicates a
situation demanding the serious concern of those who care for democracy and
freedom." Nathaniel Micklem, Book Review, 26 INT'L AFF., 143, 14344 (1950) (re-
viewing PAUL RLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949)).
"Paul Blanshard undertakes to denounce the peril [of the 'high-pressure methods'
of the Catholic Church] for the sake of those who choose to ignore it, through
either apathy, illusion, or delusion." George Barrois, Book Review, 30J. RELIGION
76, 76-77 (1950) (reviewing PAUL BLANsHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC
POWER (1949)). "The book by Blanshard ... was written for popular rather than
professional consumption, and is consequently journalistic in style. This is not to
suggest that Blanshard is as ignorant and misleading as most journalists are when
they write of law. To the contrary, Blanshard is a lawyer himself and handles the
legal aspects in knowledgeable fashion. But the book is not confined to legal is-
sues." William P. Murphy, Book Review, 1965 DUKE L.J. 436, 439 (reviewing PAUL
BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS: THE GREAT CONTROVERSY (1963)).
8. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUs EQUALITY 277 (2008).
9. Id. at 294-95.
10. Id. at 298.
[Vol. 56: p. 199200
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pliment, and I regard Nussbaum's assessment of Blanshard (about which
there will be more to say below) as indicative of the current value of his
stock.
Questions remain, though, concerning why Blanshard's ideas made
progress in some of the sharpest American minds and throughout much
of the culture in the mid-twentieth century. Questions also remain con-
cerning whether current condemnation of Blanshard supposes that his
target has disappeared. Still more questions remain, moreover, concern-
ing whether those who today condemn Blanshard's bigotry are prepared
to accept the Catholic contribution-a phrase I leave intentionally vague for
the moment-to the American experiment in democratic living. We can
ask more broadly, furthermore, whether Catholics true to their principles
are thus destined to be unreliable from a democratic point of view and, if
they are, what this means as a practical matter. If Catholics cannot be
counted on to be loyal, small "d" democrats, who is the better for it? Who
the worse?
What I would like to suggest is that faithful Catholics are indeed, in a
specific way, unreliable from a democratic point of view, in part because
faithful Catholics are never just "Catholics"; they are always already
"Church," a corporate limit on the scope and jurisdiction of the state. On
the Catholic view, "two there are," not one, by which we are ruled: state
and Church, the latter just as capable of ruling, within her sphere, as the
former, within its sphere. I would also like to suggest, further, that this
fact of dualism and its consequences, which have to do with orienting the
moral direction of the civil order, are indeed good for all concerned;
though, to appreciate as much, one must have a theory of the "good," not
just of democracy. If my conclusion is not surprising (my title pretty much
gives it away, after all), I can at least hope that some of my reasons will be
of interest, if only because they will seem so outlandish to many. And, in a
way they should seem outlandish, at least to non-Christians. As the Ameri-
can Jesuit John Courtney Murray once observed, the dualism or diarchy
the Church teaches "is not natural; indeed its establishment involved a
certain dislocation of the natural order, a diminution of the stature and
scope which the political power would have possessed in another, purely
natural dispensation."'
II. JUST THE FACTS FROM PAUL BLANHARD
"Abhor that arrant Whore of Rome, And all her blasphemies, And
drink not of her cursed cup, Obey not her decrees." Thus the New En-
gland Primer, published in 1688, taught Protestant school children to
11. John Courtney Murray, S.J., On the Structure of the Church-State Problem, in
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WORLD AFFAIRS 11, 12 (Waldemar Gurian & M.A. Fitzsi-
mons eds., 1954).
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chant. 12 Writing close to three centuries later and six decades before to-
day, Paul Blanshard concluded his bestselling American Freedom and Catholic
Power in these terms: "Those who have followed my analysis of the Catholic
problem thus far will agree that it is already too late to solve the problem
by passive measures. The Catholic hierarchy is not passive. . . . It seems
clear to me that there is no alternative for champions of traditional Ameri-
can democracy except to build a resistance movement .1.. ."3 Lest he
seem to be in the bad taste of the nasty old Protestant nativism exempli-
fied by the Primer, Blanshard was sure to distinguish the program he cham-
pioned by insisting upon a complete disjunction between the Catholic
people, who were fine, and the Catholic hierarchy, who were the enemy:
"It is scarcely necessary to say that a resistance movement can have no
place for bigots or for enemies of the Catholic people." Scarcely, indeed.
"Nor can it have any place," Blanshard continued, "for those who would
curtail the rights of the Catholic Church as a religious institution. Its sole
purpose should be to resist the antidemocratic social policies of the hierar-
chy and to fight against every intolerant or separatist or un-American fea-
ture of those policies."I 4
The resistance to these "policies," Blanshard counseled in 1949,
"should begin in the minds of all democratic-minded Americans, Catholic
and non-Catholic .1.. ."5 Writing a decade later, in an updated version of
his bestseller, Blanshard congratulated himself and other visionaries: "[I] t
is a pleasure to report that the movement has developed more rapidly
than I had dared to dream. . . . Yes, the resistance movement is here, and
it is growing with remarkable momentum." 16 That was not the limit of the
new triumphalism. "At least once in our history," Blanshard reminded his
readers in conclusion, "the American people have thrown off an alien sys-
tem of control. . . . The analogy," he conceded, "is not exact, but it con-
tains a suggestion and a hope for the solution of the Catholic problem in
the United States."' 7
There is no substitute for reading the thousands of pages Blandshard
devoted to his project, starting in his blockbuster American Freedom and
Catholic Power and continuing through some dozen more sequel volumes
well into the 1970s. Blanshard's work is rhetorically clever. Blanshard be-
gins by saying that "[n]o fair-minded man can fail to render homage to the
Church's lofty moral purpose . . . ."18 Unlike bigots of days gone by, he
12. John Courtney Murray, S.J., Paul Blanshard and the New Nativism, 5 MONTH
191, 215 (1951) [hereinafter Murray, New Nativism] (reviewing Paul Blanshard,
AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949)).
13. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 346-47.
14. Id. at 347.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 348-49.
17. Id. at 351-52.
18. Id. at 4.
202 [Vol. 56: p. 199
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purports to pursue a "documentary approach."19 Sensing "the duty to
speak," he "began [his] ten years of research."2 0 Why? "Many American
liberals have been deterred," Blanshard laments, "from an honest analysis
of the implications of Catholic rule by being associated with anti-Catholic
fanatics." This is no return of the bigotry of the old Nativism. In the past,
"the bigoted character of the sources has tended to divert attention from a
valid and important question." 21 Not any more, Blanshard promises the
reader: "I have tried in this book to put down plain facts about the Catho-
lic question, facts that every American should know. The method of treat-
ment is self-evident." 22 What better in a nation dedicated to self-evident
truths? And truths don't change. When Blanshard published the revised
version of American Freedom almost a decade after its original publication,
he added: "My theses remain unchanged. The arsenal of factual weapons
has simply been augmented and modernized to meet changing condi-
tions."23 The old attack was bigotry; the new attack is to be fair.
What, then, is the basis of the attack Blanshard assures his readership
is fair What are the "facts" that tell so strongly against the Catholic hierar-
chy? Consider the following:
Catholic young women, reared in the free and hearty atmos-
phere of modern America, are beginning to regard the whole
segregated system of nuns, wimples, and convents as medieval
posturing and useless mortification. . . . In the long run, . . . I
think that the fundamentally democratic and cooperative out-
look of the average American Catholic layman will triumph over
a medieval ecclesiastical machine-provided we cherish and de-
velop our public schools.24
This passage is typical not only in its snarkiness but, more important, in its
unceremoniously making Americanism and democracy-for Blanshard,
the two concepts are virtually convertible-the touchstone. Without bene-
fit of argument or even a trace of self-consciousness, Blanshard proceeds
on the assumed basis that what is fundamental to all true Americans is "de-
mocracy." In a phrase, the test Catholics flunk when examined by Blan-
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 302.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at viii. "After ten years Blanshard's thesis remains unchanged ...
Judged by normal standards of scholarship, the book suffers from ... defects ....
Blanshard regards his sources as an 'arsenal' and his facts as 'ammunition.'" John
Lynch, Book Review, 35 INT'L Ave. 271, 272 (1959) (reviewing PAUL BLANSHARD,
AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (2d ed. 1958)).
24. BLANsHARD, supra note 2, at 323-24. "Though in some ways harking back
to the days of the APA or the Klan, the book also marks a transitional point in the
long story of anti-Catholicism. Blanshard's critique stresses newer ideas, especially
the Church's neglect of the interests of women and its disregard of modern atti-
tudes toward sexuality." PHILIPJENKINS, THE NEw ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE LAST Ac-
CEPTABLE PREJUDICE 38 (2003).
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shard is the American commitment to democratic fundamentalism.2 5 As
John Courtney Murray explained in his review of the book, " [Blanshard's]
own indictment of the Church rests on a different set of premises [than
the old Nativism, to wit], a new Nativism. The nativist inspiration," Murray
continues, "is visible in the constant use of the adjectives, 'American' and
'un-American,' as ultimate categories of value, supplanting the usual cate-
gories of true or false, right or wrong."2 6 Murray does not exaggerate, as
becomes unmistakably clear in Blanshard's wind-up in the book's final
chapter: "It is apparent ... that the American Catholic problem is . .. that
many of the hierarchy's social and political policies are incompatible with
Western democracy and American culture."27
Many are the Catholic hierarchy's "policies" that fail on the standard
of American democracy as interpreted by Blanshard. The book's chapters
are a catalogue of them, and they concern everything from schools to "eu-
genic sterilization," the latter of which Blanshard recommends to combat
"overpopulation," which Blanshard in turn regarded as "the most basic
and formidable threat to the future happiness of the human race." 28 As a
matter of particular local color at Villanova University, which is an aposto-
late of the Order of St. Augustine, I would note that Blanshard singles out
for special censure someone for whom one of the Augustinians' other
longtime Philadelphia apostolates, Monsignor Bonner High School, was
named:
The Right Reverend John J. Bonner, diocesan superintendent of
schools of Philadelphia, boasted in 1941 that the increase in the
Catholic births in Philadelphia in the preceding decade had
been more than 50 per cent higher than the increase in the total
population.29
Not willing to let well enough alone, Bonner went on to predict that Phila-
delphia "will be fifty per cent Catholic in a comparatively short time."3 0 A
charitable interpretation would be that Monsignor was taking the long
view of history. Just four years later, Monsignor died prematurely of a
25. One reviewer summed it up this way: "Opinions will differ about the valid-
ity of Blanshard's conclusions, both as to the extent of Catholic influence in Amer-
ican public life and as to its desirability. To those who believe that man's destiny is
to be a good American democrat his thesis may be entirely convincing. Others will
notice that his conception of democracy presupposes an intolerance and conform-
ity as frightening as the Inquisition." Lynch, supra note 23, at 272.
26. Murray, New Nativism, supra note 12, at 215-16. "[V]iewed from the stand-
point of later events in North American Catholic history, it is now clear that Blan-
shard's most important Catholic conversation partner was theologian and political
theorist John Courtney Murray . . . ." MARK S. MASSA, S.J., ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN
AMERICA: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 61 (2003).
27. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 325.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. at 322.
30. Id.
[Vol. 56: p. 199204
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heart attack, thereby taking the sub specie aeternitatis view of developments
in Philadelphia.
Returning to Blanshard's fears about overpopulation simpliciter, Blan-
shard, having duly registered the Church's unqualified opposition to ster-
ilization, proceeds to deliver the good news: "Fortunately, neither the
people nor the courts of the United States agree that there is anything
necessarily wrong in depriving an insane or feebleminded person of the
capacity to reproduce by a simple and relatively painless operation which
does not even deprive him of the satisfaction of sex."31 Noting further
that there was only one dissent (and it was without opinion) from the Su-
preme Court judgment that infamously upheld compulsory sterilization,
Buck v. Bell, and that that lone dissenter was the sole Catholic Justice on
the Court, Pierce Butler (a daily communicant, by the way),32 Blanshard
responds by making his own those unmatched and almost unimaginable
words oflustice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for the Court: "Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough."33 Recall, if you have not already, that this
was also the Court of Stone, Brandeis, and Taft.
If Blanshard found American law happily at odds with "the hierar-
chy's" "policy" on sterilization, he ruefully admitted that our law and such
"policy" are at least somewhat in accord on the question of education.
Observing that since 1925 and the Supreme Court decision in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,34 the right of Catholics to operate and populate their own
schools has been constitutionally protected, Blanshard then goes on to
make the following odd claim: "The American people have no desire to
prevent Catholics from having schools of their own."33 Odd, because it is
demonstrably false. After all, the Court would not have had occasion to
hear the Pierce case if the American people known as Oregonians had not
through their elected representatives acted to deprive that state's Catholic
citizens of schools "of their own." Democratic majorities sometimes do
things that it falls to democratically unaccountable judicial actors to undo.
Conversely, it bears mentioning that Blanshard's popularity coincided
with the period that set Establishment Clause jurisprudence on its un-
happy course.3 6
There will be more to say about Pierce in due course, but first and
foremost there stands the architectonic "policy" of which the Pierce issues
are really just a subset.
31. Id. at 181.
32. Joseph Vining, The Resilience of Law, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE
OF FORCE 151, 163 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009).
33. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 181.
34. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
35. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 112.
36. See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817, 843-46 (1984) (discussing likely effects of Blanshard's
description of Catholicism on Supreme Court decisions under religion clauses).
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The Church's philosophy of church and state is far more impor-
tant than the continued existence of a bit of acreage which has its
own postage stamps and flag. In fact, the philosophy of church
and state espoused by the Vatican is the most important thing in
the whole Catholic system because it determines the political and
social policies which the bishops and priests will pursue through-
out the world.3 7
What, then, is that philosophy?
Underneath all its ponderous verbiage the Catholic theory of
church and state is quite simple. It is essentially a variation on
the doctrine of the divine right of kings.... The divine authority
of the Church is paramount in its own sphere because the
Church is God's viceregent on earth. The authority of the state
comes next and is decidedly secondary. . . 38
And finally to the heart of the matter:
In particular areas the authority of the Church is superior to that
of the United States government and of all governments, and no
government is conceded the moral right to deny this. The Pope
is a kind of special world monarch who rules a synthetic moral
empire that overlaps and penetrates the sovereignty of all earthly
governments. His special territory is religion, education, and
family life, but he also has supreme power over a vaguely defined
area known as "morals." Also he has special and exclusive juris-
diction over any matter which may affect the life of the Church
either directly or indirectly.39
Blanshard's formulations here, as elsewhere, leave much to be desired
in terms of correspondence to anything the popes, Church councils, seri-
ous Catholic scholars, or any other serious souls have actually said on the
matter. There is no honestly denying, however, that Blanshard is basically
correct that the Church makes a version of this last claim. Murray formu-
lates that claim as follows: "[T]he Church stands outside the political or-
der and above it, and that she has a spiritual authority which, remaining
spiritual, may reach into the temporal order, there to lay the protective
grasp of its authoritative moral judgments on those elements of secular life
that have a sacred aspect."40 Blanshard is having none of it. The claim
that the Church stands outside and above the state is the thesis Blanshard
means above all to deny. In perhaps the most telling clause of the entire
book, and one that Murray singled out in his review, Blanshard bids the
Church "'admit that the Church in the social sphere is simply one agency
37. BuNsHARD, supra note 2, at 60.
38. Id. at 61.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 223.
[Vol. 56: p. 199206
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within the State.'" 4 1 So telling was that clause, in fact, that Blanshard si-
lently dropped it from the second edition,4 2 though boasting, as we have
already noted, that his theses remained "unchanged."43 Caught.
III. MANUFACTURING MONISM
One reason for Blanshard's popularity was that he was preaching to
the choir, as they say, not just by appealing to anti-Catholic prejudice, but
principally by taking hold of and raising up a countervailing thesis that
had lain lodged, if largely unarticulated, in the then-common American
mind. That countervailing thesis, that the Church is simply an agency
within the state, may sound unfamiliar, a tad extravagant, or even mischie-
vous when stated so baldly. After all, it is not usually spoken in polite
society, but this is exactly because by now it is almost taken for granted
there. The thesis is entailed, however, by what is spoken in polite society
all the time. As Russell Hittinger has perceptively observed, "If we ask a
modern person who or what is sovereign, he or she would not say, 'rea-
son,' 'the individual,' or 'science,' but instead, without hesitation, 'the
state.'" 4 4 Do you doubt this? The Constitution of the United States does
not so much as mention sovereignty. As Justice James Wilson, himself a
signatory of the Declaration of Independence and a Framer of the Consti-
tution, wrote in the towering 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 4 5 in which
the state claimed immunity to suit on the ground that it was sovereign and
above the law: "To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVER-
EIGN, is totally unknown."4 6 Today, however, the U.S. Reports are thick
with imputations to the states of "sovereignty" such that they are immune
from unconsented suit by those they may have injured. And it is, I would
add tangentially, the conservatives on the Court, the erstwhile textualists,
who have led the charge on behalf of state "sovereignty." That charge may
be bad as a matter of how the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted (as I
have argued elsewhere), 4 7 but it evinces a mentality that is even worse.
41. Murray, supra note 12, at 221 (quoting Paul Blanshard, AMERICAN FREE-
DOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949)).
42. Compare PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 47
(1949) (clause appearing on page forty-seven), with BLANsHARD, supra note 2, at 64
(clause missing from equivalent page sixty-four, though sentence of which it was
originally part remains otherwise in place).
43. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at viii.
44. Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICs, AND HUMAN NATURE 4 John Witte Jr. &
Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006).
45. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
46. Id. at 454.
47. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Nor-
mative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 181 (2006); Patrick McKinley
Brennan, Sovereign States? The State of the Question from a Catholic Perspective, in FAITH
AND LAw: How RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN
LAw (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed., 2007).
2072011]
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It is, of course, possible to speak both of states and sovereigns in a way
that does not entail Blanshard's thesis. As a matter of history, however,
both modern states themselves and the discourse of sovereignty, if you
will, are traceable in large part to a widening wish for monism, a situation
in which there is just one plenary power above every nation-state. Hobbes
is the obligatory citation for this proposition. And if the power over a
given nation-state be not plenary, as in constitutionally limited govern-
ments such as our own, the monist insists that at least it should be sole.
Rousseau caught the spirit of this aspiration: "It is important ... that there
should be no factions in the State . . . .48
How does this happen? To be concrete, under the French Civil Con-
stitution of the Clergy of 1790, Catholic dioceses were all made "depart-
ments" of the state and clergy became salaried state employees. 49 My own
favorite example of the way monism is confected, though, comes a little
later, and it is the Law of Associations or the Waldeck-Rousseau Act passed
in France in 1901-and still on the books today. According to this law,
religious orders and congregations are required to obtain "authorization"
from the state in order to form or to continue to exist and operate. Re-
quests for such "authorization" were frequently denied in the post-1901
period, with the intended result that religious orders and congregations
were driven into diaspora, their houses closed, their hospitals shuttered,
their schools emptied, their good works arrested.5 0 Within a short span of
time following 1901, hundreds and hundreds of Catholic communities
were dispersed. The aspiration to monism is palpable, even when it is
achieved a little bit at a time.
But that is France. What about the United States? After all, the Fram-
ers "split the atom of sovereignty," as Justice Kennedy explained in the
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton case, by recognizing the sovereignty both
of each of the several states and of the United States. Again, I have written
elsewhere about what I regard as the incoherence of taking what was in-
tended to be a scalar quantity and then giving it degrees, and I will not
repeat that argument here. It is enough to note that this aspect of the
Framers' achievement or aspiration does not solve or even address the
problem of monism; or, to the extent it does, it does so in the wrong direc-
tion. The reason is that what the Framers did, at least aspirationally, was to
multiply (sovereign?) state governments. The question we are pursuing,
by contrast, is whether, in addition to however many or few state govern-
ments there turn out to be (each possessed of a final authority over a par-
ticular body politic), another final authority stands beside each of them, or
perhaps even bestrides each of them and all of them. The question, in
48. 2 JEAN-JACQUEs RoussEAu, THE SociAL CONTRACT iii (1762).
49. JAMES F. MACLEAR, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORy 77-83 (1995).
50. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing
the Church), 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 29, 30-33 (2009).
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other words, is whether humans are arranged under one final authority,
monism, or under two such authorities, dualism or (better) diarchy.
As we have already seen, it is Blanshard's explicit thesis that the
Church exists as an agency within the political order, not outside it, least
of all above it. Blanshard reaches monism not by denying the existence of
the phenomenon that people commonly call by the name "Church," but
by arbitrarily limiting the Church to what he refers to as the "devotional."
I say "arbitrarily" because Blanshard offers no theory of "church and state"
at all, and admits as much.5 1 Instead, he accuses the American hierarchy
of "impos[ing] its own philosophy of church and state on the American
concept ... ,a little like a child who, being unable to find the appropriate
piece to insert in a picture puzzle, jams in the wrong piece loosely."52 (just
the facts from Blanshard). "[The Church's] leaders, in full retreat before
the expanding conception of the democratic state," he continues, "have
kept repeating the unrealistic thesis of Leo XIII, that there is a natural
'orbit' for church and state and that there are 'fixed limits' between the
orbits. No independent political scientist has ever been able to discover
those fixed limits."5 3 If only such independence could be found!
Another fact, according to Blanshard, is that the Catholic hierarchy
"uses familiar words with private meanings. .. . The bishop begins by in-
cluding in the concept 'church' large areas of political, social, and educa-
tional life which the non-Catholic regards as part of the normal sphere of
democratic government."54 The imagined bishop does indeed include
within the meaning of Church almost exactly what Blanshard describes.
Blanshard, however, gives said bishop both too much credit and too little.
The bishop's meaning is hardly private. Nor is the bishop's meaning the
only public Catholic meaning. As one Protestant observed in reviewing Blan-
shard's book in the Atlantic Monthly in 1950:
It is in this dogmatic confidence that Blanshard takes issue with
the Roman Catholic Church on the crucial point for all of us: he
judges that church to be a sinister threat to the public weal be-
cause it "refuses to admit that the Church in the social sphere is
simply one agency within the State." What Blanshard ignores,
however, is that it is on exactly this point, and this alone, that
great empires have dashed themselves to pieces against the Chris-
tian Church. This is the point at which Christianity has ultimate
and final meaning for all nations; this is where an avowal of faith
in the Christian God meets its last judgment. . . . The Gospel
writers profoundly believed that the Church is not simply one
agency within the State, but that it has an authority above the
51. BLANsHARD, supra note 2, at 55; accord T. Robert Ingram, The Blanshard
Book, ATLANTic MoNTHLY 74, 77 (1950).
52. BLANsHARD, supra note 2, at 55.
53. Id. at 64-65.
54. Id. at 55, 65.
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State. The Church has believed so ever since. What Blanshard
seems unable to comprehend is that both Roman Catholics and
Protestants accept the Christian view with all the assurance of
truth evident in the secularist religion, and with equal, if not
greater, experience and reasoning power, and certainly with as
much integrity and candour.5 5
The Christian, not exclusively Catholic, claim made by the imagined
bishop originates in the Christian revelation and has received public devel-
opment through centuries of argument ever since. Refined through cen-
turies of public dialogue, the meaning is hardly private.5 6 To relegate the
Church to the sacristy, as Blanshard would do, is to take the side of the
argument earlier taken by Gallican and Stuart absolutists. In this respect,
someone called Blanshard is nothing new under the sun.
IV. THE CHURCH: AN "ERRATIC BOULDER"
In the recent Anglophone literature, the rejection of political or state
absolutism has often sounded in terms of "pluralism." In the best of this
literature, the claims are both descriptive and normative. The descriptive
claim, as by William Galston, is that the social order "consist[s] in a multi-
plicity of spheres, some overlapping, with distinct natures and/or inner
norms."5 7 Galston notes that he is proceeding "empirically" when recog-
55. Ingram, supra note 50, at 76.
56. George Weigel summarizes the millennial dynamic in these terms:
[T]he fact of the Church and its claims to authority over men's lives
meant that the emperor (later the state) could not be all in all. Politics
was thereby desacralized: because God was God, Caesar was not God and
neither were Caesar's successors, be they kings, princes, prime ministers,
presidents . . . or members of the Politburo. Because Caesar was not
God, the 'reach' of public authorities was understood to be circum-
scribed (at least in principle), the cultural ground on which a politics of
consent could be built was prepared, and an antitotalitarian vaccine was
injected into Europe's civilizational bloodstream. By the same token, it
was in the school of Christian culture that Europe learned about the
proper dignity of the secular: according to the Church, which took this
teaching from its Jewish parent, the human task was to humanize the
world, which in Christian terms meant learning to be 'at home' in the
world even as one prepared for the world to come. Thus Christianity
taught Europe that the human task was to enable the world to realize its
possibilities.
GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND POLITICS
WITHOUT GOD 104 (2005). For the story told in the terms of law, see HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAw AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
(2001).
57. William A. Galston, The Idea of Political Pluralism, in MORAL UNIVERSALISM
AND PLURALISM (NoMos XLIX) 95, 107 (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams
eds., 2009). In an interesting, out-of-the-way essay, Galston has measured his own
"liberal" position against his understanding of Catholic social thought. William
Galston, Contending with Liberalism, in 1 AMERICAN CATHOLICS & CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
42-57 (Margaret O'Brien Steinfels ed., 2004).
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nizing "the diverse forms of human sociability and association"58 that
politics and government must respect (and sometimes coordinate). The
nonmative claim, again to take Galston as our spokesman, is that such as-
sociations are valuable exactly because they allow individuals to instantiate
and share putative values/goods that others may not recognize or pre-
fer.59 A violin club, for example, can encourage excellence in violin for
each of the members in a way that the broader society cannot.
A further normative argument for associations, though, is that the as-
sociating not only encourages individual achievements of specific goods or
values (a line of good violinists), but instead a good or value that cannot
be achieved privately or even through merely partnering with others. In
what the tradition has understood as a true association (as opposed to a
partnership), corporate unity itself is one of the very reasons for action.
Marriage is an example: it has extrinsic goods as part of its objective, but
the unity itself is one of the very reasons for action. To take another exam-
ple, the Philadelphia Orchestra playing a symphony achieves not just sev-
enty or how-ever-many fine and diverse performances, but a symphony,
and it is that unity of sounds that is one of the reasons for the coordinated
musical action. As we multiply examples, from crew teams in perfect syn-
chronicity to well-ordered families, the normative value of such associa-
tions becomes unmistakable. The good of united action-the particular
common good that is intrinsically of worth to each of its members-is not
achievable in diaspora. When a husband and wife split up, they do not
each take away half of a marriage; the marriage is no more. They can
divide the bank account, but marriage is not divisible. A reason for the
state to respect (and perhaps encourage) associations, then, is that they
uniquely set the conditions of the possibility of achieving certain goods. If
a government wishes to respect and encourage goods (as any just govern-
ment will), it is not enough to respect Mr. Jones; it is also necessary to
respect Mr. Jones's associations, at least his morally upright ones. A state's
respecting a plurality of such social forms represents a genuine chink in
the monist armor, at least so long as the state recognizes that it is truly
obligated to respect such non-governmental associations.
Pro-pluralism arguments of the sort just elaborated can go a long way
toward showing why the state should respect associations, including the
particular association that is the Church. I wish to emphasize that such
arguments can be of great value in a situation of moral and religious het-
erogeneity such as our own.
What such arguments miss, however, is that, on the Catholic under-
standing of the thing, the Catholic Church, unlike every other association
or potential association, is a foundation. "The Church is 'founded' by
Christ[,]" Hans Rommen explains; "therefore it is juridically a 'founda-
tion,' not a corporation, and its constitution, its fundamental law, is given
58. Galston, supra note 57, at 109.
59. Id. at 99-100.
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directly by God and not ordained by the people. The Church, though she
may participate in certain measures in the essentials of all societies, is nev-
ertheless, a society sui generis . . . .o60 As all American law students learn,
corporations may alter their particular ends and constitutions, and may be
regulated by the civil authority. Not so the Church, however, as Rommen
goes on to explain: "The Church's end and constitution are absolute, al-
ways the same, above civilizations and historical periods."6 '
Needless to say, throughout the more than two thousand years of the
Church's history, the Church has faced governments of varied kinds, and
the Church has negotiated different kinds of relationships depending
upon the particular aspirations and claims of said governments. The
Church is more than familiar with the sort of state that would subordinate
the Church to itself. In response, the Church asserts, in the language of
the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis
Humanae, what is necessary for her to achieve the end that is hers from her
founder:
The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle gov-
erning relations between the Church and public authorities and
the whole civil order.
As the spiritual authority appointed by Christ the Lord with the
duty imposed by divine command, of going into the whole world
and preaching the Gospel to every creature, the Church claims
freedom for herself in human society and before every public
authority.6 2
Whereas Dignitatis Humanae "proceeds cautiously on other questions,"6 3
including the one for which it is best known, viz., the right to freedom of
individual conscience, on the question I am pursuing here, by contrast,
the Declaration is decisive:
Among those things which pertain to the good of the Church [,]
. . . things which must everywhere and at all times be safeguarded
and defended from all harm, the most outstanding surely is that
60. Hans Rommen, Church and State, 12 REV. OF POLITIcs 321, 322 (1950).
61. Id. at 323.
62. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration on Religious Liberty:
Dignitatis Humanae, no. 13 (Dec. 7, 1965), in VATICAN COUNCIL 11: THE CONCILIAR
AND POsT-CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 799, 810 (Austin Flannery OP ed., 1975) [herein-
after Dignitatis no. 13].
63. Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical Self-
Government, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1035, 1051 (2000). In noting the caution in the
expression, I do not question the authoritativeness of the teaching. See Robert P.
George & William L. Saunders, Jr., Dignitatis Humanae: The Freedom of the Church
and the Responsibility of the State, in CATHOLICISM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CONTEM-
PORARY REFLECTIONS ON VATICAN 11's DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1, 13
(Kenneth L. Grasso & Robert P. Hunt eds., 2006) ("To deny the moral right to
freedom from coercion in religious matters is to place oneself in opposition to an
important principle of Catholic faith.").
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the Church enjoy that freedom of action which her responsibility
for the salvation of men requires. This is a sacred liberty with
which the only-begotten Son of God endowed the Church ....
[T]o attack it is to oppose the will of God. 64
In the tradition of political theory descending from Aristotle, the polis
or any of its later alternatives, including the nation-state, is said to be a
societas perfecta, that is, a self-sufficient society dependent for its complete
existence and persistence on no other society. As the Church contended
against states that would subordinate her to themselves, the Church appro-
priated the conceptual armature of the societas perfecta for herself.6 5 This
claim is evident in the Code of Canon Law (1983) .66 Canon 113 section 1
asserts: "The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of
a moral person by divine ordinance itself."67 Canon 1254 section 1 asserts:
"To pursue its proper purposes, the Catholic Church by innate right is
able to acquire, retain, administer, and alienate temporal goods indepen-
dently from civil power."6 8 And canon 1311 provides: "The Church has
the innate and proper right to coerce offending members of the Christian
faithful with penal sanctions."6 9 Though it is not in the nature of a "penal
sanction," one might mention here the clergy's responsibility, set out in
canon 915, to safeguard the Catholic community by denying Holy Com-
munion to those Catholics who scandalize the faithful by persisting in
manifest grave sin. 70  Whereas the headlines complain of bishops'
"politicizing the Eucharist" by denying holy communion to, for example, a
resolutely "pro-choice" elected official, the Church understands herself in
that context to be, among other things, protecting her own unity or com-
munion, with any effect on the body politics-that is, on the functioning
of that other societas perfecta-as simply an unintended, though perhaps
anticipated, consequence.
With all due respect to them, run-of-the-pew Catholics have no clue
that their Church makes the claims I have just enumerated, which shows,
among other things, that the contrary Blanshardian message coming from
the culture of monism has enjoyed impressive success. These are the
Church's claims, though, and with respect to them Blanshard was, I would
like to suggest, too clever by half. His hysterical myopia with respect to the
64. Dignitatis no. 13, supra note 62, at 809-10.
65. ROBERT A. GRAHAM, VATICAN DIPLOMACY: A STUDY OF CHURCH AND STATE
ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE 228-32 (1959); Hittinger, supra note 63, at 1052-53.
66. For a discussion of some of the following examples, see Hittinger, supra
note 63, at 1053 n.117.
67. JOHN P. BEAL ET AL., NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 154
(2000). "By divine institution the Catholic Church is a group, and the papacy a
succession, of natural persons united by a common purpose and conceived of as a
single entity." Id. at 155.
68. Id. at 1453.
69. Id. at 1533.
70. Id. at 1110.
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hierarchy led him to overlook the fact, which presumably he would have
found even more disturbing, that the hierarchy and the laity cannot be
pried apart. Whereas Blanshard opined that "[fi]n a very real sense the
Catholic Church is the clergy," the reality is that the Church is the entire
People of God hierarchically arranged by divine foundation: Pope, bish-
ops, priests, deacons, and the lay faithful.7 1 Whereas Blanshard worries
that the Church as he defines it (that is, "the hierarchy") commands indi-
viduals who are extrinsic to it (the laity), the reality is that the Church is,
on her own understanding, a societas perfecta with her own internal norms,
including a legal and penal system. Whereas for Blanshard, shaped in the
Congregationalist tradition, "'church' . . . represented an essentially pri-
vate and voluntary form of religious organization, centered on piety and
worship, in which the power and authority are formed 'from the bottom
up[,]'"7 2 the reality is that the Catholic Church understands herself to be
a public association formed, by her divine founder, from the top down.
Indeed, what has been "most important [for the Church in the modern
world] was that the Church could be differentiated [from the states which
wished to dominate it] without reducing itself to the status of other private
associations."7 3
John Finnis once memorably (if dismissively) described Aristotle's ar-
gument from the "function" of natural kinds in Book I, section 7 of
Nicomachean Ethics as an "erratic boulder"7 4 on an otherwise clean field
of moral argument. What I would like to suggest is that the Church's
claims on her own behalf testify to the presence in what would otherwise
be our monistic midst of an erratic boulder of an irreducibly associational
sort, a foundation. It is notjust "Catholics," then, as if one could size them
up them seriatim and thus have taken the measure of the matter, that pose
a threat. The threat we are talking about, we should recall, is the one
71. See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON
THE CHURCH: LUMEN GENTIUM, c. III 18-29 [hereinafter LUMEN GENTIUM]; see also
Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Authority in the Church, in CIVILIZING AUTHORITY- Soci-
ETY, STATE, AND CHURCH 35-55 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2007). "[I]n the
Church authority comes from God through Jesus Christ, who instituted the
Church as a hierarchical society. By divine right, the pope and the college of bish-
ops enjoy the fullness of sacred power." Dulles, supra, at 40. You will of course
find Catholics who deny the essentially hierarchical structure of the Church, but
whatever else may be said about such Catholics, it can be said that they are not in
this respect orthodox Catholics. On the topic of "dissent," Cardinal Dulles adds
this: "Generally speaking, Catholics will be disposed to accept determinations that
come from the pope and their bishops. In exceptional cases they may be inclined
to dissent or disobey. I cannot go into all the distinctions that would be necessary
to say when or whether such negative responses might be justified. I shall content
myself with saying that disobedience and dissent, if they occur at all, should be
rare, reluctant, and respectful." Id. at 42.
72. Mark Massa, Catholic-Protestant Tensions in Post-War America: Paul Blanshard,
John Courtney Murray, and the "Religious Imagination", 95 HARv. THEOLOGICAL REV.
319, 331 (2002).
73. Hittinger, supra note 63, at 1053.
74. JOHN FINNIs, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 17 (1983).
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Blanshard fingered but could not quite describe. The threat is that there
is indeed a self-assertive imperium within the democratic imperium, the for-
mer claiming to limit (though not to de-legitimate) the latter. The threat,
then, is not simply "hierarchy" who speak on behalf of a foreign potentate;
it is, rather, a Church that, speaking and acting in all the ways that this
particular Church does speak and act, both through individuals holding
specific offices and through ecumenical councils and national confer-
ences, claims not to be foreign but at least as local and real as any county
or state could hope to be. The Church, as a universal spiritual society not
dependent on the concession or recognition of Caesar, stands as a boulder
in the path of monism.75
V. POWER OVER THE RES SACRA Homo
If metaphors sometimes assist thought, they also sometimes block
thought. Portraying the Church as a boulder illuminates it as a unity, a
spiritual authority. As an authority it claims, first, the right to the freedom
to teach, rule, and sanctify her members, and, second, by negative implica-
tion from the first, the right to an immunity from politicization, including
by subordination to the state. All of this is the first aspect of the principle
known as libertas ecclesiae, the liberty of the Church, which the Second Vati-
can Council asserted in the strongest possible terms. The other aspect of
that same freedom, obscured by the metaphor, is the right of the Church
as the people of God, as Murray explains, "to have access to the teaching
of the Church, to obey her laws, to receive at her hands the sacramental
ministry of grace, and to live within her fold an integral supernatural
life."76 But that is not all that the freedom of the people of God requires,
as Murray goes on to elaborate: "[T]he inherent suprapolitical dignity of
this life itself claims 'for the faithful the enjoyment of the right to live in
civil society according to the precepts of reason and conscience.'" Murray
continues: "And this comprehensive right, asserted within the political
community, requires as its complement that all the intrapolitical sacred-
ness (res sacra in temporalibus) be assured of their proper immunity from
politicization."7 7 Where the metaphor limps is in failing to suggest that
the people of God living their Christian lives in civil society must insist that
their sacred things be treated as sacred. This second aspect of the free-
dom of the Church, the freedom of the people of God in the world, pro-
vides nothing less, Murray concludes, than "the ultimate directive
principle of government[,] . . . mobilizing the moral consensus of the peo-
ple and bringing it to bear upon the [public] power, thus to insure that
75. On the idea of the Church as a universal spiritual society, see CHRISTO-
PHER DAwsON, THE FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM 295-310 (2d ed. 2008).
76. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAv, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLEC-
TIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 203 (1960).
77. Id.
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the king, in the fine phrase of John of Salisbury, would 'fight for justice
and for the freedom of the people."' 78
To be more specific, the thesis, which, as Murray comments, "had all
the newness of Christianity itself[,]" 7 9 is that the Church possesses by right
a power over the sacred aspects of man in the world-that is, not just over
the Word of God, the sacraments, and the Christian law, but the sacred-
ness of man's life in civil society, specifically, as Murray elaborates:
[M]an's relation to God and to the Church, the inner unity of
the human personality as citizen and Christian but one man, the
integrity of the human body, the husband-wife relationship, the
parent-child relationship, the political obligation, the moral val-
ues inherent in economic and cultural activity as aspects of
human life the works of justice and charity which are the neces-
sary expressions of the human and Christian spirit, and finally
that common patrimony of ideas which are the basis of civilized
life-the ideas of law and right, of political power and the obliga-
tions of citizenship, of property, etc.8 0
The claim with respect to this second aspect of the freedom of the
Church, then, is that the sacred power of the Church has been established
to advocate, indeed to insist upon, the secular order's reflecting in appro-
priate ways the truths about man in the world, what Blanshard regarded as
so many odious "policies." In the words of the Second Vatican Council,
which follow immediately upon its declaration of the fundamentality of
the libertas ecclesiae- "The Church also claims freedom for herself as a soci-
ety of men with the right to live in civil society in accordance with the
demands of the Christian faith."8 1
The history of modern political thought and practice, to which Blan-
shard was the largely unwitting heir, is nothing short of the history, in
identifiable but frequently overlapping stages, of the rejection of the
Church's freedom as a structural and directional principle in a free soci-
ety. In its beginning, the rejection addressed only the truth of divine reve-
lation and, therefore, the truth of the matter concerning the Church's
being more than an agglomeration of consenting souls. At that stage, the
constructive alternative was to install the individual conscience as the sole
criterion of political or any other legitimacy. As Murray explains, "[t]he
only sovereign spiritual authority would be the conscience of the free man.
The freedom of the individual conscience, constitutionally guaranteed,
would supply the armature of immunity to the sacred order, which now
became, by modern definition, precisely the order of private
conscience."8 2
78. Id. at 205.
79. Id. at 203.
80. Murray, supra note 12, at 224.
81. Dignitatis no. 13, supra note 62, at 810.
82. MuRRAY, supra note 76, at 206.
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If this seems to be a bit of a stretch, consider that the book in which
Martha Nussbaum criticizes Blanshard bears the unmistakably modern ti-
tle Liberty of Conscience. The book aspires to be a qualified defense of our
American law of religious liberty, and for Nussbaum it turns out to be
essentially about freedom of conscience, not at all about freedom of the
Church or churches. Even those who, unlike Nussbaum, favor church au-
tonomy and the liberty of the Catholic Church have to admit that Ameri-
can constitutional law probably does not include-at least not yet-the
principle of libertas ecclesiae.83 In sum, the denial of group rights which is
definitive of the modern political project has been part and parcel of the
modern rejection of the Church as something more than an assembly of
individual consciences, sort of like a sacred railway platform. To return to
the Pierce case, the Court reached the right result, but this was not because
the Court recognized a principle of libertas ecclesiae. The opinion's obscure
reasoning is what you get, on a good day, when the liberty of the Church is
not in your conceptual arsenal.
So much for the first stage. In the second stage of the rejection of the
liberty of the Church, the system of moral values that Christianity had ar-
ticulated as reflecting man's sacredness-values which, by the way, were
adopted as the basis of modern political life-are now to be known as
"simply immanent in man[.] ... [T]hese values are now simply a human
possession, a conquest and an achievement of humanity by man him-
self."84 Martha Nussbaum is again exemplary:
If we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for value
as uninteresting or irrelevant to human ethics, as we should, then
the news of its collapse will not change the way we think and act.
It will just let us get on with the business of reasoning in which we
were already engaged.85
More recently, Professor Nussbaum has embellished this theme in an in-
terview in the New York Times Magazine- "I converted to Judaism when I got
married. I had kind of gotten to the end of my rope with Christian other-
worldliness. I wanted a religion in which justice was done in this world."8 6
Why Professor Nussbaum supposes that the God of Christian revelation
does not command his rational creatures to do justice to one another,
especially the least among us, I can only speculate.
83. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT
59, 81-86 (2007).
84. MuRRAY, supra note 76, at 214.
85. Martha Nussbaum, Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the
Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 714, 740 (1994) (emphasis added).
86. Deborah Soloman, Questions for Martha Nussbaum: Gross National Politics,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., December 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
12/13/magazine/13FOB-Q4-t. html?-r= 1 &scp= 1 &sq=martha% 20nussbaum&st=
cse.
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In the third stage, many of those values are themselves rejected,
though people continue to talk in terms of individual rights that are both
swords and shields, claims and immunities. Here one need do no more
than recollect the description of contemporary moral discourse elabo-
rated by Alasdair MacIntyre in 1984 in After Virtue. In the fourth stage,
which Murray was spared by an early death, it is contended, quite stun-
ningly, that "immunity from a 'correct anthropology' is itself ajusticiable
natural right."8 7 This, of course, is exemplified above all in Lawrence v.
Texas, which has been described gleefully, including by serious intellectu-
als, as Justice Kennedy's "libertarian revolution."8 8
Writing in 1960, Murray observed that "[i]t was an essential part of
modernity's hope that the moral consensus upon which every society de-
pends for its stability and progress could be sustained and mobilized in
terms of a fortunate coincidence of individual private judgments, apart
from all reference to a visibly constituted spiritual and moral authority."89
He then immediately asked: "Has this hope proved valid?"9 0 Lawrence, I
think, requires a negative answer.9 1
Lawrence and its programmatic mentality are not, however, the last
word. The Church has not vanished as Blanshard and the other resis-
tance-movement rejecters of the dualist thesis had hoped. The Church
knows exactly what we are up against. Writing in 1991 in the encyclical
Centesimus annus, Pope John Paul II explained that "[a] uthentic democ-
racy is possible only in a state ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct
conception of the human person."92 John Paul already knew, though,
that it was perhaps too little too late. Writing just four years later in the
encyclical Evangelium vitae, John Paul tells the story of the "betrayal," a
term he uses six times in the document, by the constitutional democracies
of their duty to uphold human rights, beginning with the right to life.9 3
What is to be done? Gone are the days in which the Church, cooper-
ating sometimes in something approaching monism, could directly im-
pose the truth on society. No worries there. John Paul and now Pope
Benedict XVI sound the same note when they say, echoing Murray and
87. Hittinger, supra note 44, at 32.
88. Randy Barnett, justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 21 (2003).
89. John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Freedom of Man in the Freedom of the Church,
in MODERN CATHOLIC THINKERS: AN ANTHOLOGY 382 (A. Robert Caponigri ed.,
1960).
90. Id.
91. "Once the source of meaning and value came to reside exclusively in the
human subject, however, as it did in the modem age, any possibility of reaching a
consensus on the common good beyond that of creating an environment condu-
cive to individual self-realization became extremely difficult." Louis Dupre, The
Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS
To AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 172, 188-89 (R. Bruce Douglass & D. Hollenbach eds.,
2002).
92. Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus annus, 1 46 (1991).
93. Hittinger, supra note 44, at 32.
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Jacques Maritain of two generations ago, that the Church's influence must
now be achieved "indirectly, through evangelization and education of soci-
ety itself."9 4 On this there is agreement, and on it the hope for human
rights and social justice rests. The resulting situation is not entirely
healthy, however, because, as John Paul II also observed in Centesimus,
those who are "convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it
are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view." 95 Pope Bene-
dict sees the same problem. Here, for example, is what he said during his
2008 visit to the United States:
Have you noticed how often the call for freedom is made without
even referring to the truth of the human person? Some today
argue that respect for the freedom of the individual makes it
wrong to seek the truth, including the truth about what is good.
In some circles to speak of truth is seen as controversial or divi-
sive, and consequently best kept in the private sphere.9 6
In contemporary political theory, the indictment of those who would
shape politics and law on the basis of what they regard as a correct anthro-
pology often proceeds from the premise that it violates the requirement of
"public reason," which in turn is understood as those minima on which
agreement can in principle be expected. I have recently written about this
elsewhere and will not repeat the argument here, except to say by way of
summary that the "principle of equal respect" is said by some to require
the exclusion from law and politics of even those moral judgments on
which a convergence of opinion has in fact been achieved in the demo-
cratic process, as in the statute held unconstitutional in Lawrence. Yet
again Professor Nussbaum is exemplary: "The hope is that public institu-
tions can be founded on principles that all can share, no matter what their
religion."9 7 The "political" descended from Rawls wishes on principle to
limit the political sphere to the uncontroversial, and the remnant is rele-
gated to the private sphere. Pope Benedict saw the trouble with this.
VI. THE CHURCH, CHANGE, AND "DEMOCRACY"
More commonly than through political liberalism enacted into law,
though, it is, as Murray referred to it, an "idolatry of the democratic pro-
cess" itself that carries the day, and it is to this theme that I would like to
return. As we have already observed, Blanshard considered it sufficient to
convict the Church (or anybody else) to point out that she was "undemo-
94. Id.
95. Pope John Paul II, supra note 92; accord Hittinger, supra note 44, at 33.
96. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to Seminarians (Apr. 19, 2008).
97. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 8, at 23. My recent discus-
sion of the shortcomings of political theory that anticipates consensus on the basis
of "public reason" is in response to Professor Nussbaum's defense of the same. See
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Equality, Conscience, and the Liberty of the Church:Justifying
the Controversiale Per Controversialius, 54 VILL. L. REv. 625, 625-53 (2009).
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cratic." The Church is an easy target here. It is as true now as it was when
Blanshard wrote that the Catholic Church is simply not a democracy; the
divinity of her founder assured as much. Blanshard was especially vexed
that the undemocratic Church he knew did not find in herself the will to
commend to the architects of the political realm the democratic form of
government in unqualified terms. "You cannot find in the entire litera-
ture of Catholicism," Blanshard complained, "a single unequivocal en-
dorsement by any Pope of democracy as a superior form of
government."9 3 That was true when Blanshard wrote, and, to the best of
my knowledge, it remains true to this day.
A little-appreciated fact is that the Second Vatican Council was utterly
silent on the topic of democracy.9 9 Even Blanshard, who attended the
Council (he received a personal invitation from Pope John XXIII), seems
to have overlooked this pregnant silence, distracted as he was by the Coun-
cil fathers' violation (as he called it) of the principle of separation of
church and state, their failure to take control and revoke the "policy"
against artificial contraception, and the list that goes on for more than
three hundred pages in the book modestly titled Paul Blanshard on Vatican
II. "I am often asked," he writes in that book's preface, "[h]ave you
changed your opinion about the Catholic Church? The answer is 'Yes, "'
he continues, "but only to the extent that the Catholic Church has
changed. I am as hostile as I ever was to the autocracy of its central power
structure and to many of the family and church-state policies that flow
from that clerical autocracy."1oo
The thought that the Church changed at Vatican II is crucial to my
central topic-whether Catholics are unreliable from a democratic point
of view-because it is sometimes supposed that those changes render
Blanshardism obsolete by removing its target.' 0 Martha Nussbaum, in
her takedown of Blanshard, comments that "it is remarkable that Blan-
shard, a leading public intellectual, seems utterly unfamiliar with liberal
Catholicism, as exemplified in the work of [Jacques] Maritain and [John
Courtney] Murray." Blanshard, for his part, was far from ignorant of the
work of those two men, yet interestingly he does not group them together.
Maritain, though described by Blanshard as among "the most eminent
Catholic scholars,"' 0 2 is excoriated for holding the Catholic position we
98. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 64.
99. Hittinger, supra note 44, at 21.
100. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at iii.
101. On the effect the putative coming of "liberal Catholicism" had on the
place of American Catholics in the mid-twentieth century, see MARK MASSA, SJ.,
CATHOLICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE: FULTON SHEEN, DOROTHY DAY, AND THE NOTRE
DAME FOOTBALL TEAM 21-37 (1999). For a careful statement of the ways in which
liberalism and Catholicism today stand in relation to one another, including the
ways in which the two cannot embrace each other, see John Langan, S.J., Catholi-
cism and Liberalism: 200 Years of Contest and Consenus, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD
105-24 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990).
102. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 269.
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have already considered, which Maritian states as follows: "It is sufficient
that the Pope should consider that a sufficiently spiritual interest is in-
volved in any temporal arrangement for an intervention by him in regard
thereto to be legitimate."10 3 Blanshard does, however, show no familiarity
with Maritain's later judgment that no civil government should privilege
any church, lest the equality of citizens be disrespected and the common
good thus violated.10 4
Murray is a more interesting case here because he managed to fool
Blanshard where Maritain had not. In American Freedom and Catholic Power,
Blanshard first mocks Murray for holding, as he expressed in the Jesuit
magazine America in 1947, that "Separation of church and state . . . [is]
that negative, ill-defined, basically un-American formula, with all its over-
tones of religious prejudice." Blanshard then immediately adds, in the
revised version of the book, that "Father Murray later became the most
advanced of the 'liberal' Jesuit leaders in advocating accommodation of
Catholic policy to American values." Later in the same revised edition,
Blanshard even described as "rather devious and ambiguous" "Father Mur-
ray's rather pleasing attempt to 're-interpret' out of existence some of the
more flagrant anti-freedom doctrines of the Papacy," but cautioned that
Murray's "analysis represents nothing more substantial than scholarly wish-
ful thinking" and that "few students of Catholicism will trust the Jesuits to
reform their Church."1 05
Less than a decade later, however, in Paul Blanshard on Vatican II, the
author had to change his tune yet again, explaining that "the star of the
American delegation [to Vatican II] was John Courtney Murray, whose
chief function was to give the pedestrian bishops the right words with
which to change some ancient doctrines without admitting that they were
being changed. He built verbal bridges to the modern world very effec-
tively . . . ."106 Referring to the Council's teaching, in the Declaration on
Religious Liberty, on the right of the individual human person to religious
liberty, Blanshard concluded: "The final statement on religious liberty was
an important achievement. It will make the struggle for religious liberty
throughout the world easier. From now on every libertarian can cite an
official Catholic pronouncement endorsing the principle of liberty."107
Blanshard even gave Murray credit for those parts of the Declaration that
were written in "majestic prose." As Blanshard goes on to criticize por-
tions of the Declaration, including the one that holds that under certain
cultural circumstances the civil government can, pace Maritain, properly
give the Catholic Church special civil recognition,10 8 he altogether over-
103. Id. at 62 (quoting JACQUES MARITAIN, THE THINGs THAT ARE NOT CAE-
SAR'S (1930)).
104. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 176 (1951).
105. BLANSHARD, supra note 2, at 344.
106. PAUL BLANSHARD, PAUL BLANSHARD ON VATICAN II 87 (1967).
107. Id. at 89.
108. Id. at 95-96.
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looks, no doubt because he simply could not comprehend, the portions,
discussed above, on the liberty of the Church as the "fundamental princi-
ple" governing Church-state relations. Fooled.
Had the Church changed her teaching on the liberty of the individual
conscience? Some say yes, some say no-the question of whether Church
doctrine "changes" is heavily freighted in theology and ecclesiology. The
Church teaches that the doctrine had "developed," and the exact theologi-
cal issue-as between "change" and "develop"-need not detain us
here. 109 What is crucial is that, in addition to affirming the traditional
principle of the liberty of the Church, the Council did also affirm the right
of individual religious liberty, the right, as it is often and aptly called, to
follow one's conscience. The same Council, however, taught that the state
of course enjoyed the right, because it enjoyed the duty, to structure politi-
cal society, through law where necessary or desirable, according to a cor-
rect anthropology, without any limit to what is "uncontroversial." No
individual is to be coerced in matters of belief, but correlatively the state is
to uphold the demands of a social order consistent with the natural law
and natural human rights, doing so, of course, as the tradition has always
taught, with regnative prudence. On this the Church had not changed, and
whether one calls the result liberal, conservative, mixed, or none of the
above, nothing called "democracy" was at hand to exempt either individu-
als or whole cultures from the demands of the natural moral law and of
respect for human rights. The Church would no longer co-govern the
political sphere with the emperor (as she sometimes had in the past), but
in the words of the Council's Declaration on the Church in the Modern World,
Gaudium et spes, the work of the laity is this: "to impress the divine law on
the affairs of the earthly city."'" 0 Are people engaged in such work unreli-
able from a democratic point of view?
VII. CONCLUSION
I more than recognize that "[t]he democratic idea is close to non-
negotiable in today's world,"111 as my old teacher, Ian Shapiro, observed a
few years back in taking stock of contemporary democratic theory. The
idea, though, is a protean and malleable one, and even more ambiguous is
the expression "from a democratic point of view," which I have borrowed
from Pope John Paul II's observation, which I quoted above, that those are
"convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are unreliable
from a democratic point of view." One sense of "democracy" or "demo-
109. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LuSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 300-31 (1998);JOHN T. NOONAN,JR., A CHURCH
THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING
193-222 (2005).
110. See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DOCMATIC CONSTITUTION ON
THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: GAUDIUM ET SPEs no. 43 (1965); see also Lu-
MEN GENTIUM, supra note 71, at c. 31.
111. IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (2003).
[Vol. 56: p. 199222
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol56/iss2/1
ARE CATHOLICS UNRELIABLE?
cratic," the one favored by Jacques Maritain, refers to a participatory politi-
cal structure based on human rights. Faithful Catholics today, I believe,
can be proud to say that they are reliably democratic in this sense. Recent
popes, though sounding the notes of caution I have mentioned, have been
fulsome in their defense of participatory governing structures and human
rights and, in this context (among others), democracy.1 12
Another sense of democracy or democratic refers to majoritarianism
and the (virtual?) sufficiency of a political majority's collective decision.
This latter sense of democracy is frequently linked up with the other idea
that the people, even when they are not (nearly) unanimous, are neverthe-
less sovereign. When Justice Wilson denied that the American people un-
dertook to create sovereign states, he did so in part on the ground, alas,
that the people had reserved the sovereignty to themselves. In the Constitu-
tion, Justice Wilson explained in Chisholm, "they might have announced
themselves 'SOVEREIGN' people of the United States: But serenely con-
scious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration." Each of us is
an "original sovereign," subject to no law unless and until we put ourselves
under it.'1 3 With this assumed "fact," I believe, faithful Catholics cannot
agree.
Why? Sovereignty is a word I try not to use, except when referring to
the Almighty. It tends-indeed, is designed-to short-circuit careful argu-
ment about ruling authority. This is no doubt a reason for the word's
popularity. Among the word's meanings are, first, that its possessor has
complete (as opposed to partial) authority over something or other, and,
second, that its possessor is above (as opposed to subject to) the law. Obvi-
ously, the two meanings are related, but they are distinct. For all the rea-
sons I have been developing, the fact of the Church stands as a denial of
the first claim; the political "sovereign" does not enjoy plenary jurisdiction
over the human person. And the Church herself teaches, moreover, why
the second meaning is also false: There are no lawless pockets in history,
though there are of course instances and even epochs of disobedience.
A defining claim of a putative sovereign is that he (or she or they) are
not under law. With variations that do not here matter, this is the sense in
which Jean Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau used the term, and the idea is
always that the sovereign is not bound by law unless and until he volunta-
rily puts himself under law. But the Church teaches that there is no time,
no place when "the people" are not under law. The Catholic contribution
to the political sphere includes the claim that we are all, each of us and all
of us collectively, always under the divine natural law, which, though di-
112. See, e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF
THE SoCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 103, 106, 158, 169, 187, 190, 233, 339, 395,
406-08, 417, 424, 572 (2004). "The pleasure the Catholic might find in mocking
growing lists of human rights is dimmed when he finds the Magisterium address-
ing him with the same language." Ralph Mclnerny, Natural Law and Human Rights,
36 AM. J. JuRIs. 1, 12 (1991).
113. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454, 456 (1793).
2232011]
25
Brennan: Are Catholics Unreliable from a Democratic Point of View - Though
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
vine in its promulgation, is known by the use of our natural powers of
intelligence. This is the law on the basis of which human law can be made;
this is the law that gives us our natural rights; this is the law that provides
the basis for criticizing and perhaps disobeying human laws that are in fact
perversions of law through their violations of human rights and their dep-
rivations of what is good for humans. The person who objects to a perver-
sion of law on the basis of the divine natural law is not engaging in the
simple self-assertion or aesthetic preference that is sometimes the modern
way; rather, he or she is reaching a legal judgment according to a real law
of divine provenance. This, the Catholic position, is radical doctrine, as
rulers who have been faced with it throughout history have discovered.' 1 4
Law does not begin with the human ruler, but instead both makes possible
and delimits such ruling.1 1 5 This is good not just for Catholics but for all
concerned.
The not-so-hidden agenda of modernity and post-modernity has
been, though, in the words of Remi Brague, "the reduction of the idea of
law to a purely human phenomenon."' 16 As Brague goes on to observe,
"There is nothing to prove that the Western conception of the political is
secure, or even viable in the long run. Whether human action can unfold
freely, with no reference to the divine, rather than losing its way in suicidal
dialectics, remains to be seen."1 1 7 Meanwhile, though, the Catholic
Church and Catholic persons remain at hand to remind us all that there is
a higher law according to which we and our artifacts are to be judged (in
terms of whether they are good for us). It is not surprising that Paul Blan-
shard was especially disturbed by the Catholic claim that democratically
enacted law is not necessarily binding. As Blanshard says, "the word 'defy'
is not contained in the Papal encyclicals, but the word 'resist' is there, and
its meaning is unmistakable." 1 8 Indeed it is. As Blanshard also says, "[i]f
the hierarchy once conceded that ultimate sovereignty lies wholly in the
people, anything might follow."' 19 Right again, Blanshard. In sum, and
to quote Murray: "[A]s indictments of the Church go, Mr. Blanshard's is
not very substantial."12 0
114. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Natural Law as Subversive: The Case of Aqui-
nas, 41-63, in 2 ETHICS AND POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS (2006).
115. One perceptive reviewer of Blanshard observed that "[i]n his uniformly
condemnatory discussion of Church teaching, law, and practice in these fields, one
discerns a basic sociology of law that is hinged to a theoretically naive revolt against
all law as an infringement of liberty." Albert S. Foley, Book Review, 28 Soc. FORCES
226 (1949) (reviewing Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power (1949)).
116. REMI BRAGUE, THE LAw OF GOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA
238 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2007).
117. Id. at 263.
118. BI..ANsHARD, supra note 2, at 68.
119. Id. at 64.
120. Murray, supra note 12, at 218.
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Are Catholics unreliable from a democratic point of view? It is de-
voudy to be hoped that they will be in the second, that is, the Blanshardian,
sense I have just identified: by their insisting and acting to ensure, through
prudent means and otherwise in conformity with valid positive law, that
the state and its laws be measured and shaped according to the terms of
higher law, the law that puts us under higher obligation (and derivatively
gives us our natural human rights).121
What, finally, of the predictable and important objection that what I
am suggesting invites social conflict?' 22 In answer to this question, I will
close by quoting Blanshard on something Hilaire Belloc said:
Some Catholic authorities are frank enough to admit that the
conflict goes back to an irreconcilable difference between the
Church and American democracy in their attitudes toward gov-
ernmental power. Hilaire Belloc called it a "necessary conflict
between the Civil State and the Catholic Church where the two
are not identified." He then went on to say: "The Catholic
Church is in its root principle at issue with the Civic definition
both of freedom and authority. For the purpose of the State,
religion is either a universally admitted system, or a matter of
individual choice. But by the definition which is the very soul of
Catholicism, religion must be for the Catholic First, a supreme
authority superior to any claims of the State; Secondly, a corporate
thing, and not an individual thing; Thirdly, a thing dependent
upon authority, and not upon a personal mood; Fourthly, a guar-
antee of individual freedom in all that is not of faith." Belloc
admits that these principles are in fundamental conflict with the
American outlook, and he predicts that a struggle that "will seem
monstrous" may develop ... For once, I think Mr. Belloc was a
good prophet. The signs of the "monstrous" conflict which he
predicted are all about us.123
121. As I have argued extensively elsewhere, this does not amount to a license
for, among other things, judges' doing whatever they want (in the name of "higher
law" or of anything else) from the bench. The obligation of a body politic pru-
dently to conform itself, including through the tool of human law, to higher law
unfolds against a background in which that body politic creates and assigns juris-
diction to make law. Positive law is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of
what judges (and other government actors) are authorized to do. See Patrick Mc-
Kinley Brennan, Delivering the Goods: Herein of Mead, Delegation, and Authority, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REv. 308.
122. "[C]oncern that Catholicism-or any religion-improperly prepares its
adherents for democratic life risks becoming a rival theological claim." McGreevy,
supra note 6, at 131.
123. Bi sHARD, supra note 2, at 73. "As long as Catholicism in the United
States remains loyal to the Bishop of Rome and maintains that it has the authority
to teach doctrine as something objective, it will be foreign to the contemporary
American ethos." Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J., Reflections on Contemporary Anti-Catholicism,
21 U.S. CATH. HISTORIAN, 37, 44 (2003). Forgarty notes, as have many others, that
with the success of presidential candidate John F. Kennedy's alluring appeal to
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Indeed they are, Mr. Blanshard; indeed they are. May you rest in peace.
"conscience" rather than the Church, many "Catholics adopted a Protestant eccle-
siology in which religion was ultimately private and invisible, as opposed to the
Catholic position that the Church was visible and inserted in the world." Id. at 42.
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